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1751 
ONE-ACTION IN MORE STATES: THE 
PROPRIETY OF EXPANDING THE KANSAS ONE-
ACTION RULE INTO OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most second-year law students who have completed an introductory 
course on civil procedure can explain the doctrines of issue and claim 
preclusion—collectively known as res judicata—with some proficiency.1 
By successfully invoking either doctrine, one can avoid having to defend 
against a prolonged and expensive lawsuit. A defendant who fails to meet 
the elements of either probably will not be able to preclude a plaintiff‘s 
action.
2
 This is not the case in Kansas. The one-action rule in Kansas 
prohibits a plaintiff from securing a comparative fault determination and 
then suing other defendants for injuries arising from negligence related to 
the same transaction.
3
 Developed through a string of judicial 
 
 
 1. Issue preclusion is often referred to as collateral estoppel. In this Note, the two terms will be 
used interchangeably. The common elements of issue preclusion are (1) an identical issue of fact or of 
law (2) that was actually litigated and determined in a previous suit (3) resulting in a valid and final 
judgment (4) to which the determined issue was essential. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 694 (7th ed. 2008). Claim preclusion prevents a plaintiff from suing the same defendant 
again for damages arising from the same transaction that was the subject of the earlier suit. Id. at 668. 
The ―same transaction‖ standard is not used by all jurisdictions, and even among those that apply this 
standard, the requirements may differ. For purposes of this Note, this explanation is sufficient. See id. 
at 674 n.2 (explaining the difference between transactional tests and narrower ones, and discussing the 
potential relevance of the use of ―claim‖ in res judicata statutes as opposed to ―cause of action‖). 
 2. Many states do have compulsory joinder statutes for ―indispensable parties.‖ See, e.g., COLO. 
R. CIV. P. 19; MO. SUP. CT. R. 52.04(a). The Missouri rule states: 
A person shall be joined in the action if: (1) in the person‘s absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person‘s 
absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person‘s ability to protect that 
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the 
person has not been joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant.  
Id. Subsection (b) of this rule permits the court to ―determine whether in equity and good conscience 
the action should proceed among the parties before it or should be dismissed, the absent party being 
thus regarded as indispensible,‖ when the absent party meeting the requirements of subsection (a) 
cannot be joined. Id. Such compulsory joinder rules usually operate to compel a party to join in 
litigation before its conclusion, and I can find no examples of them being used to preclude subsequent 
suits based on prior adjudication. 
 3. See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text. It is true that in certain circumstances the same 
result could be accomplished through the application of issue preclusion to comparative negligence 
actions. See, e.g., Kathios v. Gen. Motors Corp., 862 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1988). Kathios held that, since 
a prior suit determined plaintiff‘s total damages and his percentage of fault, the plaintiff was precluded 
from pursuing a subsequent recovery from another negligent defendant. Id. at 950–51. The court 
reasoned that New Hampshire law required the plaintiff‘s negligence to be compared against that of all 
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interpretations of the Kansas comparative negligence statute,
4
 the rule has 
since been embraced by the legislature and has enjoyed consistent support 
in Kansas courts.
5
 
If the Kansas one-action rule furthers all of its justificatory principles—
judicial economy, fairness, and consistency, to name a few
6—why have 
the courts and, ostensibly, legislatures of other states refused to follow 
Kansas‘s lead and adopt an identical rule? This Note will begin by 
providing a brief history of the one-action rule, from its (mostly) judicially 
created origins to its explicit approval by the Kansas legislature.
7
 It will 
also examine the current status of the doctrine in Kansas, including recent 
modifications and clarifications.
8
 The following part will discuss the rule‘s 
failure to expand into other jurisdictions that have expressly considered its 
rationale and implications.
9
 The concluding part will analyze the 
justifications for both supporting and opposing the expansion of the one-
action rule
10
 and provide possible reasons that the rule has not caught on 
the way some commentators think it should have.
11
 Ultimately, this Note 
proposes that, at least from a theoretical standpoint, the one-action rule 
provides an element of fairness that might otherwise be missing from 
comparative negligence law.
12
 But the practical uncertainties underlying 
the rule‘s application might justify most jurisdictions‘ hesitance to adopt 
something substantially similar. The rule‘s practical implications should 
be investigated so that sufficient information exists for jurisdictions to 
make informed decisions regarding its adoption.
13
  
 
 
the defendants, so the issue of plaintiff‘s comparative negligence was indeed identical in the prior case. 
Id. at 949–50. However, section 2(a) of the Uniform Model Comparative Fault Act provides that ―only 
the fault of the present party defendants can be at issue in a case.‖ John Scott Hickman, Note, 
Efficiency, Fairness, and Common Sense: The Case for One Action as to Percentage of Fault in 
Comparative Negligence Jurisdictions That Have Abolished or Modified Joint and Several Liability, 
48 VAND. L. REV. 739, 750 (1995) (citing Uniform Model Comparative Fault Act § 2(a), 12 U.L.A. 42 
(1977)). This means that jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Model Comparative Fault Act 
will not be able to follow the reasoning of Kathios. 
 4. See infra note 29. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See Hickman, supra note 3, at 763–68. 
 7. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 8. See infra Part II.C. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See Hickman, supra note 3, at 768–69. 
 12. See infra Part V. 
 13. See infra Part V. 
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II. HISTORY: FROM CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE DETERMINED IN ONE-ACTION 
A. The Old Rule: Contributory Negligence 
The Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed the old contributory negligence 
rule in the late nineteenth century case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
Adams.
14
 There, the court explained that ―where the plaintiff seeks to 
recover for injuries on the ground of defendant‘s negligence, . . . if the 
ordinary negligence of the plaintiff directly or proximately contributed to 
his injury, he cannot recover.‖15 The only exception to this rule arose when 
―the [plaintiff‘s] injury was intentionally and wantonly caused by the 
defendant.‖16 In Adams, the plaintiff‘s contributory negligence barred her 
from recovering damages after she sustained injuries from being thrown 
from a wagon that was struck by a train.
17
 The court held that the plaintiff 
failed to exercise ordinary care by not stopping and looking for the train.
18
 
When the plaintiff argued that she could not have seen the train coming 
due to the contour of the landscape and obstructions blocking the view, the 
court concluded ordinary care would have entailed stopping and listening 
for the coming train, which could have prevented the collision.
19
 
 
 
 14. 6 P. 529 (Kan. 1885). 
 15. Id. at 530. The vast majority of cases that applied the ―total bar‖ contributory negligence rule 
in Kansas specifically phrased the rule in terms of automobile accidents, absent any indication that it 
was meant to be restricted to that context. See, e.g., Sheeley Baking Co. v. Suddarth, 241 P.2d 496, 
499 (Kan. 1952) (―[I]t must be conceded that a plaintiff‘s contributory negligence will bar recovery in 
an action to recover damages sustained in a collision between two automobiles and that a demurrer to 
evidence should be sustained where his contributory negligence clearly appears therefrom.‖); Most v. 
Holthaus, 227 P.2d 144, 147 (Kan. 1951) (―That a plaintiff‘s negligence, or his contributory 
negligence, will bar him from recovery in an action for damages sustained in an automobile casualty 
. . . cannot be questioned.‖). 
 16. Adams, 6 P. at 530. In Frazier v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 157 P.2d 822, 829 (Kan. 1945), the 
Kansas Supreme Court analyzed the relevant precedent to conclude that ―wanton conduct or 
wantonness comes between negligence on the one hand and wilful [sic] or malicious misconduct on 
the other.‖ The Adams court‘s use of ―intentionally and wantonly,‖ then, is probably more accurately 
interpreted as ―intentionally or wantonly.‖ See Adams, 6 P. at 530.  
 17. Adams, 6 P. at 529. 
 18. Id. at 531–32. 
 19. Id.; accord Leavenworth Lawrence & Galveston R.R. Co. v. Rice, 10 Kan. 426, 430 (1872). 
In Leavenworth, a train approaching an intersection failed to ring a bell or blow a whistle to signal to 
potential travelers ahead that it was coming, and the plaintiff was subsequently injured by the train. 
See id. at 428, 434. Overturning the lower court‘s ruling that the defendant‘s failure gave the plaintiff 
the right to assume no train was coming, the court held, ―[t]he failure to ring the bell by the defendant 
gave no warrant to the plaintiff to relax her own vigilance in crossing the track, nor did it release her 
from the duty of using all her senses as a prudent person to avoid injury.‖ Id. at 430. ―She was bound 
still to use her eyes, though no sound from the coming train reached her ears.‖ Id. 
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While the ―total bar‖ rule of Adams was still being applied into the 
mid-twentieth century, the Kansas Supreme Court, in another line of 
decisions, had begun to temper the harsh results of the rule in certain cases 
much earlier.
20
 It did so primarily by emphasizing the proximate cause 
requirement for a plaintiff‘s actions to effectively preclude recovery under 
the doctrine of contributory negligence.
21
 In Union Pacific Railway Co. v. 
Henry,
22
 the defendant challenged a jury instruction permitting the 
plaintiff to recover for injuries resulting from the defendant‘s negligence, 
even if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, as long as the 
plaintiff‘s ―negligence was slight, and did not contribute directly to cause 
the injuries complained of.‖23 The court upheld the jury instruction, 
holding that, under the circumstances of the case, ―[s]light negligence on 
the part of the driver . . . would not relieve the defendant from liability.‖24 
In the earlier case of Sawyer v. Sauer,
25
 the Kansas Supreme Court made 
explicit the difference between the Kansas rule and the rule followed by 
other states that did not allow for a slightly negligent plaintiff to recover 
against a negligent defendant:
26
 
It is true, some of the New York decisions say that any negligence 
on the part of the plaintiff will defeat a recovery; but these courts 
reject the idea of degrees of negligence, and hold that if one does 
that which ordinarily prudent men would have done, he is guilty of 
no negligence, so that they in fact announce no different doctrine. In 
this state we recognize the different degrees of negligence, and 
therefore the instruction is in this respect properly worded. The law 
does not regard the remote causes of an injury. It is enough to 
determine the proximate causes.
27
 
 
 
 20. For a more thorough analysis of the early cases drawing the empathy of the Kansas Supreme 
Court with respect to plaintiffs whose causes of action were barred due to contributory negligence, see 
Stephen B. Angermayer & Tammy M. Martin, Kansas Comparative Negligence Law—An Operational 
Analysis, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 340, 342–43 (1988). 
 21. Id. 
 22. 14 P. 1 (Kan. 1887). 
 23. Id. at 3. 
 24. Id.; accord Kan. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pointer, 14 Kan. 37, 50 (1874) (―It is settled in this state that 
where the negligence of the plaintiff is but slight, or only remotely contributing to the injury, it will not 
defeat a recovery.‖). But cf. Goodloe v. Jo-Mar Dairies Co., 185 P.2d 158, 166 (Kan. 1947) (holding 
that ―a plaintiff‘s negligence, or his contributory negligence, will bar him from recovery‖ with no 
mention of a distinction between slight and ordinary negligence). 
 25. 10 Kan. 466 (1872). 
 26. Id. at 472. 
 27. Id. (citations omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/5
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Thus, the Kansas Supreme Court was aware long ago of the potential 
harsh consequences of barring recovery to all negligent plaintiffs, and 
sought to prevent this consequence by excluding slight or remote 
negligence from that which is the proximate cause of an injury.
28
 
B. The Kansas Comparative Negligence Statute 
In 1974, the Kansas legislature officially replaced contributory 
negligence with comparative negligence with the passage of section 
60-258a.
29
 The statute provides, in relevant portion: 
(a) The contributory negligence of any party in a civil action shall 
not bar such party or such party‘s legal representative from 
recovering damages for negligence resulting in death, personal 
injury, property damage or economic loss, if such party‘s 
negligence was less than the causal negligence of the party or 
parties against whom claim for recovery is made, but the award of 
damages to any party in such action shall be diminished in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to such party.
30
 
But subsequent sections of the statute did more than repeal the somewhat 
strict contributory negligence rule. The following sections of the statute 
have been interpreted as creating the one-action rule, which bars a plaintiff 
who has secured a comparative negligence determination against one or 
more defendants from bringing a subsequent negligence action against 
other defendants for injuries arising from the same transaction: 
(b) Where the comparative negligence of the parties in any such 
action is an issue, the jury shall return special verdicts . . . 
determining the percentage of negligence attributable to each of the 
parties, and determining the total amount of damages sustained by 
each of the claimants . . . . 
 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (West 2009). The enactment of the Kansas statute 
apparently coincided with a nationwide trend away from contributory negligence and toward 
comparative negligence. See Hickman, supra note 3, at 742 (―In 1950 only five jurisdictions in the 
United States applied comparative negligence to most negligence cases. By 1995, forty-six states had 
adopted comparative negligence by either legislative or judicial action. This move toward comparative 
negligence has been defined as a reaction against the harsh results of the contributory negligence 
defense available at common law.‖). 
 30. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(a). As shown from the text of the statute, the Kansas rule 
permitted recovery in any case in which the plaintiff‘s negligence was less than that of the defendant.  
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(c) On motion of any party against whom a claim is asserted for 
negligence resulting in [injury], any other person whose causal 
negligence is claimed to have contributed to such [injury], shall be 
joined as an additional party to the action. 
(d) Where the comparative negligence of the parties . . . is an issue 
and recovery is allowed against more than one party, each such 
party [is] liable for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded 
as damages to any claimant in the proportion that the amount of 
such party‘s causal negligence bears to the amount of the causal 
negligence attributed to all parties against whom such recovery is 
allowed.
31
 
Among the first cases to interpret the new Kansas statute was Brown v. 
Keill,
32
 which provided for computation of the comparative negligence of 
nonparties to an action in order to ensure consistent fault apportionment.
33
 
There, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged the dual purposes of the 
statute—―the abolition of contributory negligence as a bar to recovery‖ 
and ―to provide for the awarding of damages on the basis of comparative 
negligence.‖34 In Brown, the court explained that ―under the Kansas law as 
it existed prior to statutory comparative negligence a plaintiff could 
choose his tort-feasor and a defendant had no right to bring in another joint 
tort-feasor to plaintiff‘s action.‖35 The opinion goes on to explain that, 
before the statute, a plaintiff could effectively recover damages completely 
disproportionate to a defendant‘s negligence by strategically choosing 
which defendants to sue, and further, from which to collect.
36
 After 
―reviewing the court decisions in other states‖ and concluding that ―no 
other state has the exact combination of provisions as does Kansas,‖ the 
court in Brown found it necessary to construe the statute pursuant to the 
perceived legislative intent.
37
 It concluded that the legislature intended the 
 
 
 31. § 60-258a(b)–(d). 
 32. 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978). 
 33. Id. at 876. 
 34. Id. at 870. These purposes seem to fall roughly in line with the split mentioned previously in 
the text, with the former being a function of subsection (a) and the latter coming from subsections (b), 
(c), and (d). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. For a more in-depth analysis of opportunistic plaintiffs‘ behavior under the old joint and 
several liability rules, see Hickman, supra note 3, at 743–47. 
 37. 580 P.2d at 871. The main contention at issue in the court‘s interpretation was whether the 
statute meant to limit fault apportionment to parties present at trial, or to allow the negligence of all 
potentially negligent parties, whether joined or absent, to be compared. The ambiguity arises from the 
language in subsection (d) referring to ―parties against whom . . . recovery is allowed,‖ in contrast with 
the language in subsection (a) referring to each party being liable in proportion to its negligence. Id. at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/5
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statute ―to impose individual liability for damages based on the 
proportionate fault of all parties to the occurrence which gave rise to the 
injuries and damages even though one or more parties cannot be joined 
formally as a litigant or be held legally responsible for his or her 
proportionate fault.‖38 Thus, nonparties to an action could have their 
negligence determined under the statute so long as their negligence ―gave 
rise to the injuries and damages‖ being sued for in the action.39 
Four days after Brown, the Kansas Supreme Court decided Eurich v. 
Alkire.
40
 There, the court made explicit the preclusive effect of failing to 
join a potential responsible party in a comparative negligence action.
41
 
Expanding upon its interpretation of the statute in light of its recent 
analysis of the legislature‘s intent, the court held: 
[W]e believe it was the intent of the legislature to fully and finally 
litigate all causes of action and claims for damage arising out of any 
act of negligence subject to K.S.A. 60-258a. The provision for 
determining the percentage of causal negligence against each person 
involved in a negligence action contemplates that the rights and 
liabilities of each person should be determined in one action. 
Because all issues of liability are determined in one action there can 
be no reasonable argument that the issues should be relitigated.
42
 
The court went on to explain that this holding meant that any party named 
in a negligence action that failed to join or cross-claim against another 
potentially negligent defendant was ―forever barred‖ from a subsequent 
comparative negligence action.
43
 In Eurich, the driver and passenger of an 
automobile had been sued for negligence, and the victim secured a fault 
attribution of 40 percent to Eurich and 60 percent to Alkire, with a damage 
award of $50,000.
44
 Before the conclusion of the case, Eurich filed a claim 
 
 
874–75; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(a), (d) (West 2009). The problem is that an unnamed 
party whose negligence contributed to a plaintiff‘s injuries would necessarily result in a violation of 
one of these clauses: either its fault would not be apportioned, and it would not be held liable in 
proportion to its negligence, or the fault of a party against whom recovery is not permitted would be 
determined. 
 38. Brown, 580 P.2d at 876. 
 39. Id. While it is apparent from the discussion in Brown and the language in the statute, it is 
perhaps worth noting that the subsequent case of Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788, 797 (Kan. 
1980), explicitly cited Brown as holding that ―the concept of joint and several liability between joint 
tortfeasors which previously existed in this State no longer applies in comparative negligence actions.‖ 
 40. 579 P.2d 1207 (Kan. 1978). 
 41. Id. at 1208–09. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1209. 
 44. Id. at 1208. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1758 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1751 
 
 
 
 
against Alkire for damages from the same occurrence.
45
 The court held 
that Eurich‘s suit was barred because he failed to cross-claim against 
Alkire in the previous suit. It reasoned that allowing the subsequent action 
against Alkire would violate the legislature‘s intent ―to fully and finally 
litigate all issues and liability arising out of a single collision or 
occurrence‖ in one action.46 
In Kennedy v. City of Sawyer,
47
 the Kansas Supreme Court extended 
the application of the Kansas comparative negligence statute to cases 
involving imputed negligence—strict liability and implied warranty in 
products liability.
48
 It reasoned that cases might arise involving both 
common law negligence and strict liability or implied warranty claims, all 
arising from the same injury.
49
 Keeping in line with the ―equitable policy‖ 
of ―assessing proportionate liability based upon comparative degrees of 
causation,‖ the court decided to apply section 60-258a to these situations.50 
The Kansas Supreme Court decision Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengesellschaft
51
 detailed the preclusive effect of prior comparative 
negligence determinations based on different types of claims, namely 
common law negligence and strict liability, as permitted by Kennedy. 
After an automobile collision between Glynn Albertson and Vernon 
Travis, Albertson sued Travis for negligence.
52
 The jury found damages of 
$275,000 and attributed 40 percent fault to Albertson and 60 percent to 
Travis, leaving Albertson with a judgment of $165,000.
53
 Albertson then 
sued Volkswagen for damages arising from the same accident under a 
products liability theory.
54
 The district court judge hearing the case used 
collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of the damage award, but permitted 
relitigation of fault attribution because he believed the fault of different 
 
 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 1208–09. 
 47. 618 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1980). 
 48. Id. at 798. Kennedy also addressed the effect of a settlement between the plaintiff and one of 
several negligent defendants on the settling tortfeasor‘s right to indemnity in light of the statute‘s 
abolition of joint and several liability. See id. at 802–04. It concluded that to avoid the deterrence of 
reasonable settlements, settling tortfeasors were still entitled to indemnity in accordance with the 
factfinder‘s determination of fault and damages. Id. The settling defendant has the same obligation 
under § 60-258a to use subsection (c) ―to bring into the action all tortfeasors against whom 
comparative liability through indemnity is sought.‖ Id. at 803. 
 49. Id. at 796–97. 
 50. Id. at 797. 
 51. 634 P.2d 1127 (Kan. 1981). 
 52. Id. at 1128. 
 53. Id. at 1128–29. 
 54. Id. at 1128. 
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parties was a separate issue.
55
 The Kansas Supreme Court held on review 
that there was no need for the doctrine of collateral estoppel because ―the 
doctrine of comparative fault [was] dispositive.‖56 It reasoned that there 
was one occurrence from which Albertson sustained the injury at the base 
of both suits—the collision. Thus, the comparative negligence statute, as it 
had been interpreted over time, clearly barred the subsequent comparative 
negligence determination sought by Albertson after the conclusion of a 
prior negligence action arising from the same collision.
57
 In so holding, the 
court, in line with Kennedy, expressly rejected Albertson‘s claim that the 
distinction between a strict liability action and a common law negligence 
action was significant for determining the applicability of the one action 
rule. It explained that ―strict liability in tort does have a fault basis, 
therefore subjecting it to comparison with other fault concepts.‖58 Noting 
that this approach would ―prevent a multiplicity of [law]suits,‖59 the court 
stated that even those parties that ―cannot be formally joined or held 
legally responsible‖ must be considered in the fault determination or they 
will ―escape liability.‖60 
C. Current Status: Limiting the One-Action Rule 
In the years since Albertson, Kansas courts have limited the one-action 
rule to a very specific set of circumstances. One such limit is expressed in 
Mathis v. TG & Y,
61
 in which the Kansas Supreme Court refused to apply 
the one-action rule to preclude a plaintiff‘s suit where his previous suit had 
not resulted in a comparative fault determination.
62
 After citing Eurich as 
expressing ―the intent of the legislature to fully and finally litigate in a 
single action all causes of actions and claims for damages arising out of 
any act of negligence,‖ the court denied use of the rule to the defendant 
 
 
 55. Id. at 1129. The issue of damages being barred from relitigation meant that the most 
Albertson could recover from the subsequent suit against Volkswagen would have been $110,000, 
depending on the amount of damages attributed to each Albertson and Volkswagen in the second suit. 
Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1132.  
 58. Id. at 1131. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1132. 
 61. 751 P.2d 136 (Kan. 1988). In Mathis, the plaintiff filed successive lawsuits against different 
groups of defendants for injuries arising from the same occurrence (being hit on the head by door 
closure while leaving a store, leading to tinnitus and hearing loss). Id. at 136–37. With the first lawsuit 
still pending, the plaintiff settled with the parties to the second lawsuit, and it was consequently 
dismissed with prejudice. Id. 
 62. Id. at 139. 
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even though the plaintiff had filed and concluded a separate negligence 
action based on the same alleged injury.
63
 Mathis thus exemplifies the 
principle that it is insufficient that a plaintiff brought a previous action 
based on comparative fault; rather, it is necessary that an actual 
determination of the relative percentages of fault be determined in the 
prior action in order for a defendant to enjoy the preclusive effect of the 
one-action rule.
64
 This principle was made even more explicit in Mick v. 
Mani,
65
 where the court cited Mathis, among other cases, for the 
proposition that ―a plaintiff may pursue separate actions against tortfeasors 
where there has been no judicial determination of comparative fault. Thus, 
the exceptions to the one-action rule arise when there has been no prior 
judicial determination of fault.‖66 
Kansas courts have also refused application of the comparative 
negligence statute to cases involving breach of express warranty, despite 
its aforementioned extension into cases involving breach of implied 
warranty. In Broce-O’Dell Concrete Products, Inc. v. Mel Jarvis 
Construction Co., Inc.,
67
 the Kansas Court of Appeals held that, because a 
plaintiff in a suit based on breach of express warranty is not required to 
prove either negligence or some specific defect, it is proper to refuse 
application of the comparative negligence statute to these cases even 
though the statute does apply in implied warranty cases.
68
 The court 
explained that an exception might arise if the alleged breach of express 
 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. The court explained that ―[a]fter an adjudication of comparative fault, no party should be 
afforded a second opportunity to litigate percentages of causal negligence. K.S.A. 60-258a certainly 
contemplates one action in which comparative fault is determined.‖ Id. (emphasis added). 
 65. 766 P.2d 147 (Kan. 1988). Mick involved a rather complicated scenario. The plaintiff, Mick, 
was injured while working on a drilling rig, and Mani, along with other doctors, treated him for his 
injuries. Id. at 148. First, Mick sued all allegedly negligent parties whose negligence contributed to the 
initial accident, and then he sued the doctors who treated him for injuries stemming from medical 
malpractice. Id. Eventually, all parties to the first action were dismissed (some due to settlement 
agreements), except for Bethlehem Steel, and Mani was the only remaining defendant in the 
subsequent action. Id. While the action against Mani was pending, Bethlehem Steel secured a verdict 
finding no fault on its behalf. Id. When Mani moved for summary judgment based on the one-action 
rule, the court first reiterated the principle that a prior judicial determination of fault was necessary to 
preclude a subsequent suit, but then held that a finding of no fault on behalf of a defendant is indeed a 
comparative fault determination. Id. at 148–49, 156–57. It therefore affirmed the summary judgment in 
favor of Mani. See also Childs ex rel. Harvey v. Williams, 757 P.2d 302, 304 (Kan. 1988) (―We held 
in Mathis that each plaintiff must be allowed a trial judicially determining comparative fault, 
regardless of whether the plaintiff had the opportunity to do so earlier in one action.‖) (emphasis 
added). 
 66. Mick, 766 P.2d at 156. This limitation was recently endorsed in Dodge City Implement, Inc. 
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 205 P.3d 1265 (Kan. 2009). 
 67. 634 P.2d 1142 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). 
 68. Id. at 1145.  
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warranty caused ―death, personal injury or physical damage to property,‖ 
given their specific mention in the statute, but ―[i]f the result [of the 
breach] is simple economic loss, liability and damages are governed by 
breach of contract principles.‖69 In so holding, the court also noted that, 
even in implied warranty cases, there had to be death, personal injury, or 
physical property damage to invoke the comparative negligence statute.
70
 
The statute‘s exclusion of situations involving purely economic loss 
continued until it was amended in 1987 to specifically apply to situations 
involving economic injury.
71
 
Although the history of the one-action rule shows that it is essentially a 
judicially created doctrine, when the Kansas legislature amended the 
statute in 2010, the Judicial Council Civil Code Advisory Committee 
noted that the ―changes in this section [were] intended to be stylistic 
only.‖72 Thus, ―[i]nterpretations of K.S.A. 60-258a prior to 2010 . . . 
should remain authoritative.‖73 The one-action rule, therefore, remains 
valid today. 
III. TREATMENT OF THE ONE-ACTION RULE AND SIMILAR PROCEDURAL 
RESTRAINTS BY COURTS OF OTHER STATES 
When given the opportunity to consider their own comparative 
negligence laws in relation to the Kansas one-action rule and the potential 
to construe similar statutes as creating such a rule, courts in other 
jurisdictions have differed drastically in their approaches. For example, 
Iowa has a comparative negligence statute providing for compulsory 
joinder of indispensable parties, but its courts have refused to treat the 
failure to join potentially negligent parties in an earlier suit as preclusive. 
In Selchert v. State,
74
 the Supreme Court of Iowa sought to answer a 
relatively simple question: ―Does Iowa‘s comparative fault act require 
joinder of all potential defendants in one action?‖75 After the car in which 
Selchert was riding went off the road and struck a pole, she sued the owner 
of the vehicle, the driver at the time of the accident, and an alleged 
dramshop.
76
 Selchert secured a fault determination of 75 percent against 
 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v. Black, 781 P.2d 707, 720 (Kan. 1989). 
 72. 4 KAN. CODE OF CIV. PROC. ANNO. § 60-258a (2011). 
 73. Id. 
 74. 420 N.W.2d 816 (Iowa 1988). 
 75. Id. at 817. 
 76. Id. 
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the driver of the vehicle, while the other 25 percent was attributed to 
Selchert.
77
 The trial court also found damages ―in excess of $1.6 
million.‖78 Selchert then commenced an action against the state and city in 
which the accident occurred, as well as the power company that owned the 
telephone pole, for their alleged negligence contributing to her injuries.
79
 
The Iowa Supreme Court first rejected the lower court‘s conclusion that 
the defendants should have been joined as ―indispensable parties‖ to the 
prior litigation and that the plaintiff‘s failure to do so precluded a 
subsequent suit.
80
 It then entertained the defendants‘ contention that it 
should ―follow the lead of the Kansas Supreme Court‖ and establish a one-
action rule to further the ―perceived legislative intent to fully and finally 
litigate, in one action, all the rights and liabilities of every person involved 
in a tort action.‖81 In refusing to interpret its joinder rule as mandatory 
rather than permissive (thereby refusing to adopt a one-action rule like that 
of Kansas),
82
 the court expressed its commitment to separation of powers 
principles: 
Like Kansas, our court has recognized that ‗the modern and 
enlightened trend is to combine in one action for trial all claims and 
actions involving several persons in a single incident.‘ But, unlike 
our colleagues in Kansas, we are unwilling to rewrite our 
comparative fault act or rules of procedure to achieve this noble 
objective. Had our legislature intended to include in the section 
668.2 definition of ‗party‘ all those persons involved in an 
occurrence, whether or not named as a claimant or defendant, it 
 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 818–19. The ―indispensable parties‖ rule comes from Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 
1.234(2), which describes a party as indispensable if ―the party‘s interest is not severable, and the 
party‘s absence will prevent the court from rendering any judgment between the parties before it; or if 
notwithstanding the party‘s absence the party‘s interest would necessarily be inequitably affected by a 
judgment rendered between those before the court.‖ IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.234(2). The Selchert court held 
that the parties to the subsequent action were not indispensable because ―[n]othing about the interests 
of [those parties] prevented the prior court from rendering judgment on Selchert‘s claim against the 
driver, vehicle owner or dramshop. The fact that those allocations of fault may affect or even 
complicate the apportionment of fault in the [subsequent] action does not make the defendants‘ 
interests incapable of severance or inequitably affected.‖ Selchert, 420 N.W.2d at 819. 
 81. Id. at 820. 
 82. The joinder rule at issue was former IOWA R. CIV. P. 24 which stated: ―Any number of 
defendants may be joined in one action which asserts against them, jointly, severally or in the 
alternative, any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series 
of transactions or occurrences, when any question of law or fact common to all of them is presented or 
involved.‖ Id. at 819. 
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could easily have done so. Likewise, we perceive no movement to 
amend our rules of procedure pertaining to joinder of claims and 
parties.
83
 
The court then went on to explain that its opinion should not be read as 
encouraging the legislature to adopt a one-action rule to preclude suits like 
Selchert‘s.84 Thus, Selchert was allowed to proceed with her subsequent 
suit.
85
 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee went the opposite direction in 
Samuelson v. McMurtry,
86
 affirming the existence of a one-action rule for 
comparative negligence actions in Tennessee.
87
 One of the doctors named 
as a defendant in a medical negligence case was dismissed by the trial 
court sua sponte, and the plaintiff went on to secure a comparative 
negligence determination of 51 percent against one of the remaining 
defendants (with the other 49 percent being attributed to the deceased).
88
 
Relying on Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procudure,
89
 in 
addition to section § 20-1-119 of the state code,
90
 the court stated the rule 
in Tennessee that ―where the separate, independent negligent acts of more 
than one tortfeasor combine to cause a single, indivisible injury, all 
tortfeasors must be joined in the same action, unless joinder is specifically 
prohibited by law.‖91 In that case, this meant that the plaintiff‘s failure to 
 
 
 83. Selchert, 420 N.W.2d at 820 (quoting Hyde v. Buckalew, 393 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Iowa 
1986)). 
 84. Id. at 820–21. 
 85. Id. at 821. The court noted that the plaintiff bringing successive actions in situations like 
Selchert‘s is the one that has to ―bear the expense of multiple suits in order to satisfy her claim to full 
recovery. . . .‖ Id. 
 86. 962 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1998). 
 87. Id. at 475–76. 
 88. Id. at 474. Samuelson involved a wrongful death action brought by the father of the deceased, 
so the injured party and the plaintiff were not the same. Id. 
 89. The rule provides, in relevant part: ―In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth affirmatively facts in short and plain terms relied upon to constitute . . . comparative fault 
(including the identity or description of any other alleged tortfeasors) . . . .‖ TENN. R. CIV. P. 8.03. 
 90. Section 20-1-119(a) provides, in relevant part: ―In civil actions where comparative fault is or 
becomes an issue, if a defendant . . . alleges in an answer or amended answer to the original or 
amended complaint that a person not a party to the suit caused or contributed to the injury or damage 
for which the plaintiff seeks recovery, and if the plaintiff‘s cause or causes of action against that 
person would be barred by any applicable statute of limitations but for the operation of this section, the 
plaintiff may . . . either: (1) Amend the complaint to add the person as a defendant pursuant to TENN R. 
CIV. P. 15 and cause process to be issued for that person; or (2) Institute a separate action against that 
person . . . .‖ TENN. CODE. ANN. § 20-1-119 (2009). 
 91. Samuelson, 962 S.W.2d at 476. While it is not readily apparent from the text of the two rules 
that a plaintiff’s failure to join a potential defendant in a negligence action would preclude a 
subsequent action against that defendant, the court explained that this conclusion is the product of a 
line of decisions interpreting those rules and applying them to principles of comparative negligence. 
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appeal the dismissal of one of the doctors precluded him from pursuing the 
dismissed party in a separate suit.
92
 Acknowledging that this amounted to 
―[t]he trial court‘s errors depriv[ing] the plaintiff of the right to proceed 
against the [dismissed] defendant,‖ the court explained that this result was 
warranted because ―[t]he defendants other than [the one that was 
dismissed] were deprived of an opportunity to have fault apportioned 
against [the dismissed defendant].‖93 Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
reasoned that considerations of fairness weigh in favor of a one-action 
rule, even in a situation where the plaintiff‘s mistake was not in failing to 
join, but rather in failing to appeal an erroneous dismissal.
94
 
The only other state to have had a similar preclusion rule is New 
Jersey.
95
 Broader than the one-action rule, New Jersey‘s ―entire 
controversy doctrine‖ was expanded greatly by its Supreme Court decision 
in Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange.
96
 While the original doctrine 
precluded claims and defenses that could have been asserted in previous 
suits from being brought subsequently, the court in Cogdell extended this 
preclusive effect to parties that could have been included in prior 
litigation: 
 We thus conclude that the entire controversy doctrine 
appropriately encompasses the mandatory joinder of parties. 
Accordingly, we now hold that to the extent possible courts must 
determine an entire controversy in a single judicial proceeding and 
 
 
Id. at 475–76 (citing Owens v. Truckstops of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420, 428 (Tenn. 1996); Volz v. Ledes, 
895 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tenn. 1995); Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79, 83 (Tenn. 
1996)). Although the language quoted here seems to indicate that the one-action rule would apply to 
all tort actions involving multiple tortfeasors responsible for injuries arising from the same occurrence, 
the Samuelson court noted that Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1997), restricted the rule to 
negligent tortfeasors only. Samuelson, 962 S.W.2d at 476 n.1. 
 92. Samuelson, 962 S.W.2d at 476.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 475–76. 
 95. The conclusion that no other state has such a rule is supported by a relatively recent law 
review note surveying the various types of preclusion law available to potential defendants. See 
Hickman, supra note 3. While the note failed to mention Tennessee‘s preclusion rule as an exception 
to the general rule (along with Kansas and, at one time, New Jersey), the timing of the note in relation 
to the judicial development of the Tennessee rule might account for this apparent discrepancy. Either 
way, it is safe to say that the one-action rule is not an available preclusion tool in most jurisdictions. 
See also Howard M. Erichson, Of Horror Stories and Happy Endings: The Rise and Fall of 
Preclusion-Based Compulsory Party Joinder Under the New Jersey Entire Controversy Doctrine, 9 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 757, 760 (1999). (―Only one other jurisdiction [besides New Jersey] has 
attempted preclusion-based compulsory party joinder of any sort. In Kansas, a statutory ‗one-action 
rule‘ precludes claims against parties who were not joined in an earlier proceeding involving a 
comparative negligence determination.‖). 
 96. 560 A.2d 1169 (N.J. 1989). 
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that such a determination necessarily embraces not only joinder of 
related claims between the parties but also joinder of all persons 
who have a material interest in the controversy. 
 Therefore, the current Rule on party-joinder must be amended to 
require mandatory joinder of parties consistent with our explication 
of the entire controversy doctrine.
97
 
 The mandatory party joinder component of the entire controversy 
doctrine was eliminated by amendments to the New Jersey court rules in 
1998.
98
 This was largely the result of a line of cases yielding apparently 
inequitable results from the application of the newly broadened doctrine.
99
 
Thus, Kansas and Tennessee appear to be the only jurisdictions that 
currently apply a one-action rule to preclude subsequent suits by a plaintiff 
who has already secured a comparative fault determination in a negligence 
action. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Support for the one-action rule is commonly justified by reference to 
notions of judicial economy, fundamental fairness, and the integrity of the 
judicial system.
100
 Arguments based in each principle are quite logical. 
Judicial economy is accomplished by avoiding lawsuits that would be 
allowed to proceed but for their preclusion under the doctrine.
101
 
Fundamental fairness can be said to result from the impossibility of 
strategically selecting defendants based not on their actual fault, but on the 
depth of their pockets, under the one-action rule.
102
 The integrity of the 
judicial system is protected in a similar manner: the preclusive effect of 
the one-action rule ensures one cohesive resolution to a situation involving 
interconnected liabilities, preventing the sorts of logical inconsistencies 
and repeated consideration of comingled issues that might result from an 
 
 
 97. Id. at 1178. 
 98. See N.J. CT. R. 4:30A (―Non-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy 
doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the entire 
controversy doctrine . . . .‖) (emphasis added); see also Erichson, supra note 95, at 768–69.  
 99. Erichson, supra note 95, at 764–69. For the cases that, according to Erichson, played a major 
role in motivating the amendment to the doctrine, see Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & 
Ciesla, 662 A.2d 509 (N.J. 1995) and Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance 
Co., 662 A.2d 536 (N.J. 1995). 
 100. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy 
and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809 (1989); Hickman, supra 
note 3. 
 101. See infra Part IV.A. 
 102. See infra Part IV.B. 
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alternative doctrine.
103
 This part examines these purported benefits of the 
one-action rule from the positions of both supporters and opponents and 
will then turn to the rule‘s possible expansion into other jurisdictions.  
A. Judicial Economy 
The argument for the one-action rule from a concern for judicial 
economy is not difficult to grasp. It seems intuitive that precluding more 
lawsuits, under most circumstances, would automatically conserve judicial 
resources. Indeed, even the Selchert court characterized the one-action rule 
as a ―method[] of achieving judicial economy.‖104 The United States 
Supreme Court has also repeatedly cited the ―scarce judicial resources‖ of 
today‘s litigious society.105 John Scott Hickman explains that the concern 
for judicial economy is addressed by the one-action rule because it 
eliminates the incentive for a plaintiff to hold off on suing one or more 
potential defendants.
106
 In a system allowing successive suits, plaintiffs 
have good reason to strategically select which defendants they sue and in 
what order.
107
 Even if res judicata applied to preclude a subsequent suit 
(as in Kathios),
108
 resources are expended in determining the preclusive 
nature of the first suit under the doctrine of res judicata, especially if the 
doctrine‘s applicability depends on the jurisdiction in which the action is 
brought. The simplicity of a one-action rule would probably be more 
effective at preventing the subsequent suit from being brought at all, let 
alone making its way through the court system to a determination on 
 
 
 103. The integrity of the judicial system is essentially protected as fundamental fairness and 
finality are accomplished. Thus, it is more of an overarching concern that is residually addressed 
through achieving those other objectives. See Freer, supra note 100, at 814 (―The avoidance of 
inconsistent judgments fosters public faith in the administration of justice.‖). 
 104. Selchert v. State, 420 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Iowa 1988).  
 105. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (―Courts should think carefully 
before expending scarce judicial resources to resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or 
statutory interpretation that will have no effect on the outcome of the case.‖) (internal quotes omitted); 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (―Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce 
these days.‖). Professor Richard Freer noted the consequences of today‘s judicial inefficiency:  
Backlogs are epidemic, and we have seen the rise of bureaucratic justice to help handle the 
deluge. Despite the unprecedented recent increase in the number of federal judgeships, judges 
represent barely five percent of the federal judiciary‘s payroll. They are supported by an 
increasingly large phalanx of assistants—magistrates, law clerks, law student ―interns‖—to 
whom they are forced to delegate greater responsibilities. Still, even with all this help, the 
federal courts seem in danger of losing control of their dockets.  
Freer, supra note 100, at 810–11. 
 106. Hickman, supra note 3, at 763–64.  
 107. Id. at 750. 
 108. Kathios v. Gen. Motors Corp., 862 F.2d 944, 950–51 (1st Cir. 1988). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/5
  
 
 
 
 
2013] ONE-ACTION EXPANSION 1767 
 
 
 
 
appeal. It is difficult to perceive a reasonable counterargument to the 
assertion that the one-action rule, in theory, serves the objective of 
conserving judicial resources by preventing repetitive and avoidable 
lawsuits arising from the same injury. 
B. Fairness 
Like the argument in favor of a one-action rule to promote judicial 
efficiency, the argument based on fairness is quite intuitive. In most 
comparative negligence actions, the resulting fault determination attributes 
a total of 100 percent to the parties present.
109
 Thus, it would unfairly 
advantage a plaintiff to subsequently secure an inconsistent fault 
determination against other defendants, even if the issue of damages was 
precluded from relitigation.
110
 In order to be logically consistent, the 
percentage attributed to the second group of defendants must reduce either 
the plaintiff‘s fault attribution or that of the defendant(s) to the previous 
action. If it reduced the plaintiff‘s fault, it would undermine the jury‘s 
determination of the plaintiff‘s contributory negligence in the first 
action.
111
 If it operated to reduce the fault of the prior defendants, the 
jury‘s determination (and the finality of the judicial system) would again 
be challenged, except now the plaintiff is potentially able to recover from 
multiple defendants in excess of their total amount of fault.
112
 
 
 
 109. While the Kansas Supreme Court in Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 876 (Kan. 1978), 
specifically held that the fault of nonparties could be compared if their negligence ―gave rise to the 
injuries and damage‖ at issue in the case, I can find no cases, even in Kansas, in which the fault of 
nonparty defendants was compared, resulting in a determination of less than 100 percent to those 
present. 
 110. See Hickman, supra note 3, at 766–67. 
 111. See id. 
 112. An example may provide clarification. Suppose Alicia is injured while riding in a car with 
Brian. Brian had been holding his cell phone while driving due to a lapse in functionality of the hands-
free calling system in his car, and was not able to navigate an unusually tight left turn with one hand. 
Instead, he drove off the road into a ditch. Alicia sued both Brian and the car manufacturer, who also 
manufactures the hands-free system in the vehicle, for negligence. The jury is instructed to determine 
the comparative negligence of the three parties with a total of one hundred percent being apportioned, 
as well as the total amount of damages resulting from Alicia‘s injuries. It finds damages of $100,000 
and attributes 20 percent fault to Alicia, 50 percent to Brian, and 30 percent to the manufacturer. 
Immediately thereafter, Alicia learns that the intersection may have been negligently designed and that 
the municipality in which the accident occurred and the engineering firm responsible for designing the 
intersection were potential defendants in her suit. Suppose Alicia were allowed to bring a subsequent 
action to hold the municipality and the engineering firm proportionately responsible for their 
negligence. How could their fault be determined without either (a) reducing the proportionate fault of 
Alicia, Brian, or the manufacturer, determined in the previous action, or (b) allowing a subsequent 
adjudication which would result in more than 100 percent of total fault or total damages of more than 
$100,000? Essentially, either the finality of the jury‘s determination in the previous action must be 
sacrificed, or the subsequent action must result in a logical inconsistency. 
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Alternatively, requiring the later court to look to the prior adjudication to 
apportion financial responsibility further burdens judicial resources that 
are already limited.  
Furthermore, even if the fault of a nonparty defendant is apportioned in 
an action, that determination is unlikely to have any bearing on the 
defendant‘s responsibility in a subsequent action (if such an action is 
permitted).
113
 Thus, the possibility of subsequent action to secure a 
complete determination of the fault of all responsible parties is either 
unfair to an unsuspecting plaintiff who is then precluded from securing a 
proportionate recovery, or unfair to defendants who must bear the risk of 
paying the plaintiff more than their fair share of damages. 
Despite accounting for many of these concerns, Richard Freer stops 
short of advocating a system of preclusive joinder requirements, such as 
the one-action rule.
114
 Instead, he argues that the interests of fairness and 
judicial economy justify a modification of current compulsory joinder 
rules, simultaneously giving courts more discretion and expanding their 
power to compel joinder of parties whose presence would ensure the 
achievement of ―overall resolution of the entire dispute between all 
interested persons—parties and absentees alike.‖115 Freer believes this 
system will sufficiently account for plaintiffs‘ due process rights where 
―[t]he plaintiff is entitled to due process, to a fair and convenient forum, 
 
 
 113. Fault apportioned to a nonparty defendant is unlikely to bear on a subsequent proceeding at 
least in part because of due process concerns. See Freer, supra note 100, at 819–20. Allowing a court 
to determine the financial liability of a defendant that was not joined in the action to defend itself 
probably runs afoul of the prohibition of depriving one of property without due process of law. Thus, 
even if the fault of nonparty defendants were allowed to be taken into account for comparative 
negligence apportionment, it is highly likely that either (1) the determination would have no bearing 
on the actual liabilities of that defendant and would only serve to disadvantage a plaintiff by 
essentially allowing the responsibilities of those defendants present to be reduced according to the 
fault attributed to the absent defendant; or (2) in a less-likely alternative, the plaintiff would have to 
bring a subsequent action (assuming such were permissible) against the defendant who was absent 
from the prior suit, but whose negligence was nonetheless determined therein, and secure a judgment 
for an amount consistent with the percentage that was essentially ―set-aside‖ in the previous action. 
For example, if Alicia (from footnote 112) realized the possibility of holding the municipality 
accountable for the negligently constructed intersection, a court that allowed the apportionment of the 
negligence of nonparty defendants could also attribute a portion of fault to the engineering firm despite 
its absence from the suit. (Although such an absence seems illogical and highly impractical, it must be 
assumed for a discussion of the apportionment of fault of nonparties to the action.) If Alicia were 
allowed to then sue the engineering firm, and the previous suit were to have any preclusive effect (due 
to res judicata or otherwise), the comparative negligence of Brian and the car manufacturer should 
remain undisturbed. Thus, assuming the prior court found the engineering firm‘s negligence to be 20 
percent responsible for Alicia‘s injuries, it would result in a logical inconsistency (i.e., an 
apportionment of greater than 100 percent total fault) for a subsequent suit to find any greater 
responsibility in the firm‘s negligence.  
 114. Freer, supra note 100, at 840. 
 115. Id. at 839. 
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but has no right to exclusive possession of center stage regardless of the 
consequences on scarce judicial resources.‖116 He warns against the 
adoption of a hard-and-fast rule that eliminates the discretion of the 
judiciary: 
 Accordingly, I do not propose a ―legal vacuum cleaner‖ to 
sweep all potential parties automatically into a single proceeding. 
The threat of multiple actions should not compel joinder, but should 
compel consideration of joinder. I favor empowering the district 
court to assess ex ante the possible effects of duplicative 
litigation—not only on the absentee or parties, but on the 
availability of a scarce societal resource—in considering whether to 
compel packaging.
117
 
Thus, Freer‘s recommendation would seemingly permit—or even 
encourage—joinder of parties, regardless of the type of action, if such 
joinder is equitable and promotes judicial economy. However, he stops 
short of advocating a blanket policy for eliminating subsequent suits 
where a prior one has already concluded. Put differently, Freer‘s proposal 
is forward-looking in the sense that it seeks to avoid inefficiency by 
ensuring the full adjudication of all claims in the first suit, while the one-
action rule is backward-looking in that it precludes a plaintiff who has 
already made an inefficient decision from burdening the system with the 
effects of that decision.
118
 
In an article addressing the issue of repetitious litigation, John McCoid 
supported Freer‘s approach over the one-action rule.119 McCoid explained 
the appeal of the forward-looking approach as follows: 
While it is tempting to seek to package litigation into a single suit 
by means of preclusive devices, provision of the opportunity to be 
heard guaranteed by due process argues that an inclusive device 
ordinarily is superior. Moreover, because a policy against 
multiplicity is not the only value at stake in cases of multiparty 
litigation centering on a single transaction, an inclusive device that 
 
 
 116. Id. at 833. 
 117. Id. at 840. Freer‘s article identified the widespread recognition of a need for legislative action 
to further the interest of judicial economy: ―Increasing numbers of observers agree that the damage 
caused by duplicative litigation is serious enough to warrant extraordinary congressional action.‖ Id. at 
850. However, Freer thought that ―[w]hile congressional action will help, it is important to remember 
that most packaging problems can be addressed without it.‖ Id. at 851.  
 118. Id. at 840–51. 
 119. John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1976). 
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permits weighing of competing values at the outset is highly 
desirable. Mandatory joinder offers both kinds of advantages, along 
with the power of courts to insist upon it when the parties are 
indifferent or even opposed to it.
120
  
Noting that ―[t]he remedy is sometimes worse than the disease,‖ McCoid, 
similarly to Freer, urged caution in the conclusion of his essay.
121
 However 
he did express that ―[f]urther experimentation in all three directions [(res 
judicata, joinder, and consolidation)] by courts alert to [their potential] 
dangers . . . seems desirable.‖122 
V. PROPOSAL 
McCoid is correct that experimentation is necessary to determine 
which method of achieving judicial efficiency is preferable, but the 
situation does not necessarily present a purely dichotomous relationship 
between alternatives. More discretion for the judiciary to compel joinder 
of necessary parties seems appropriate.
123
 ―Necessary,‖ for the sake of 
determining which parties can be joined by such a process, should be 
defined broadly to include protecting the interests of nonparties to the 
action, as suggested by Freer.
124
 But determining comparative negligence 
in one action would seem to always be provided by such a rule. So a 
special mandate for comparative negligence determinations does not seem 
excessive.
125
 The broadening and strengthening of mandatory joinder 
 
 
 120. Id. at 728. This is the language relied upon by the Selchert court in support of its position 
against encouraging the legislature to adopt a one-action rule. See Selchert v. State, 420 N.W.2d 816, 
820–21 (Iowa 1988). It is worth noting, however, that McCoid also did not advocate the complete 
inaction of the Selchert court. The court is correct that McCoid suggests ―that a cautious approach to 
the multiplicity problem should be urged.‖ Id. at 821. But his article specifically encourages 
strengthening the doctrine of mandatory joinder, and the court‘s opinion, along with its reluctance to 
advocate a one-action rule, completely failed to encourage the legislature to address the problem of 
piecemeal adjudication of injuries arising from the same occurrence. See id. at 820–21; McCoid, supra 
note 119, at 724–28.  
 121. McCoid, supra note 119, at 728. 
 122. Id. The potential dangers mentioned by McCoid include the ―assertion of claims that 
otherwise would never be litigated,‖ the deterrence of settlements, and increased expenses of parties to 
litigation. Id. 
 123. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. For the purpose of establishing guidelines for the 
court‘s broad authority to compel joinder, ―necessary‖ has been used interchangeably with terms such 
as ―indispensable‖ and ―interested.‖ Freer, supra note 100, at 838–39. 
 125. Comparative negligence actions would seem to specifically entail the compulsory joinder of 
all possible negligent parties, especially under the broad definition of ―necessary parties‖ proposed 
above. It seems impossible to envision a situation in which a party whose negligence may have 
contributed to the injuries of the plaintiff in a comparative negligence action would not be deemed 
necessary to a final and just adjudication of the matter at hand. At the very least, the joinder of that 
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would supplement the increased efficiency resulting from a one-action 
rule.
126
 Maintaining (or adopting, in states other than Kansas) the 
preclusive consequence of any failure to include a necessary party, 
supplemented by this additional discretion and ability of judges and parties 
to compel the joinder of interested nonparties, would more adequately 
ensure that the one-action rule did not allow nonparties to escape 
responsibility.
127
 Efficiency and fairness would theoretically be best served 
by the adoption of both broad compulsory joinder and a one-action rule.
128
 
One possible problem with such a system involves potentially 
negligent parties either unknown or unknowable to the plaintiff at the time 
of the comparative negligence action.
129
 Take, for example, a plaintiff in a 
comparative negligence action injured in a car wreck, with fault 
apportioned between the car manufacturer, the driver, and the plaintiff (a 
passenger in the wrecked car). Suppose also that this plaintiff had realized 
the potential fault of the municipality in constructing and maintaining a 
negligently designed intersection and joined them in the action. But 
suppose this plaintiff failed to consider the comparative negligence of the 
engineering firm responsible for designing the intersection, and the firm‘s 
negligence was not considered in the prior action, where 100 percent of 
fault was attributed. Assuming the municipality had an interest in not 
compelling the joinder of the engineering firm in the action,
130
 and that the 
two individuals (the plaintiff-passenger and the defendant-driver of the 
vehicle) had no reason to know that the city hired an outside engineering 
 
 
party would be necessary to ensure that the other defendants in the action are not inappropriately 
burdened with financial responsibility for injuries caused by others. Additionally, many defendants are 
unable to financially satisfy judgments against them, so it would often also be in the plaintiff‘s interest 
to ensure that such parties are present in the action to have their fault determined and financial 
responsibility attributed accordingly. Thus, a preclusion-based compulsory joinder rule would likely 
add little other than a bright-line requirement to a system of compulsory party joinder broadly 
applicable to situations involving potential repetitive litigation arising from a single transaction or 
occurrence.  
 126. Freer, supra note 100, at 844. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See supra Parts IV.A–B and text accompanying notes 124–27. 
 129. McCoid touches on this concern in his discussion of the due process considerations 
underlying preclusion-based compulsory joinder. See McCoid, supra note 119, at 728. 
 130. Admittedly, it is difficult to envision a situation in which a municipality would rather face 
greater potential liability than compel the joinder of another responsible party whose negligence would 
likely reduce the financial responsibility of the municipality. However, one can think of situations in 
which a defendant and an absent party with potential responsibility have such a relationship that it 
would make strategic sense for the party to the action to exclude, or at least fail to actively include, the 
absent party. One such situation would likely arise with corporate defendants in parent-subsidiary 
relationships with other potential defendants. Surely there are other situations in which a defendant, 
although facing liability, would strategically choose not to compel the joinder of another potential 
defendant. 
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firm for designing intersections, the resulting inability of the plaintiff to 
hold the engineering firm responsible for its negligence allows the firm to 
escape liability due to the plaintiff‘s ignorance.131 This exemplifies the 
concern that a preclusion-based system of compulsory joinder for 
comparative negligence actions might unfairly benefit strategic and 
intelligent parties that are somehow able to hide their existence from the 
plaintiff and any adverse defendants until the conclusion of the first suit.
132
 
The possibility that a preclusion-based system would allow such 
manipulation and avoidance of responsibility is indeed problematic.
133
 
Under such a system, a defendant would essentially be free to openly 
admit its negligence contributing to an individual‘s injuries so long as the 
individual has already secured a comparative negligence determination 
against other defendants relating to the same injuries. However, due to the 
remoteness of this possibility and the rarity of cases in which it will 
actually arise,
134
 the countervailing considerations of efficiency, fairness, 
 
 
 131. There is a reasonable argument that the failure of this system to account for the engineering 
firm‘s proportionate responsibility for injuries partially resulting from its negligence is not a 
significant issue because the plaintiff has theoretically achieved full recovery from the other negligent 
parties, and the only party whose negligence would have likely been reduced by that of the engineering 
firm would have been the municipality. Thus, the strategic (or other) failure of the municipality to 
compel the joinder of a party whose existence and responsibility it was well aware of results in its 
increased liability, and nothing fundamentally unfair has resulted. (That the municipality is the party 
whose comparative negligence would have been reduced by that of the engineering firm seems to be a 
logical assumption in light of the lack of any relationship between its negligence and that of any other 
party and the relatedness of the negligence of the firm and the municipality in designing and 
constructing the roadway.) Because the plaintiff has achieved a recovery proportionate to the total fault 
of all other negligent parties, and the defendants have suffered only to the extent of their own 
negligence and that of those parties whose existence and responsibility they were probably aware of, 
no real unfairness has resulted, says the argument. However, there are other considerations that 
undermine the insignificance of holding each party proportionately responsible. For example, many 
municipalities have set maximum limits on their tort liabilities, so the seemingly innocuous 
substitution of the engineering firm‘s comparative negligence and that of the municipality becomes 
potentially devastating to a plaintiff with injuries far in excess of the statutory damage cap for 
municipal liability. Furthermore, there is a more theoretical problem with substitutions of liability. A 
common assumption of the civil judicial system is that it exists to hold parties responsible, not merely 
to ensure fair compensation to plaintiffs for their injuries by any means necessary. Thus, one might say 
that it is problematic for the system to be indifferent to whether plaintiffs secure judgments against the 
correct party based truly on proportion of fault. 
 132. Cf. Drescher v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 585 F. Supp. 555, 558 n.1 (D. Conn. 1984) 
(permitting a successive suit to proceed based in part on the fact that the plaintiff‘s failure to join the 
defendant in the prior action was a ―reasonable mistake‖). 
 133. See supra note 131. 
 134. The situations in which a potential defendant would escape liability due to its negligence 
being attributed to a party defendant are likely those in which the party defendant knew or should have 
known of the presence of the potential defendant and its possible responsibility. Thus, the proposed 
system puts the onus on the party best able to identify and compel the joinder of a potentially 
responsible party who has not been joined in the action, and any failure to do so probably only works 
to the detriment of that party. It is possible that situations exist in which the plaintiff itself would bear 
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finality, and logical consistency likely outweigh any concern for the 
craftiness of particularly clever, irresponsible defendants.
135
 Thus, it 
becomes important to assess whether such considerations are actually 
realized through the adoption of a one-action rule, or if they are purely 
theoretical consequences of the doctrine that are unlikely to occur.
136
  
The most glaring issue in the debate over the propriety of the expansion 
(or continuation) of the one-action rule is the lack of studies or statistics 
showing any actual increased efficiency due to the adoption of these and 
similar rules.
137
 This paucity of information is striking in light of the 
frequency with which judicial efficiency and the scarcity of judicial 
resources are cited in contemporary legal writing.
138
 Such an absence of 
data partially justifies the caution urged by McCoid and Freer.
139
 But if a 
lack of information continues to motivate a lack of action, progress with 
regard to the efficiency of the judicial system seems impossible: the lack 
of data will continue to foster a fear of experimentation, and the lack of 
experimentation will significantly stifle any efforts toward broad-scale 
data collection. Consequently, I agree with McCoid that cautious 
experimentation is necessary.
140
 I disagree, however, about the level of 
caution that is appropriate under the circumstances. The type of caution 
that I would urge pertains to the implementation of any system of 
compulsory party joinder. Ideally, the adoption of such a significant 
procedural doctrine would not cause individuals who happened to be 
plaintiffs during the transitional period to be unfairly disadvantaged. 
Ensuring fairness during the period immediately following the adoption of 
a compulsory joinder rule with broad judicial discretion would not seem to 
be problematic. Because the judiciary would be encouraged to join any 
―necessary‖ parties to the litigation (broadly defined) in order to achieve 
full and fair resolution of all potential claims and liabilities,
141
 it is likely 
that the operation of this rule would have immediate positive results with 
 
 
the burden of such an oversight (or strategic omission), but again, such situations are probably rare and 
exceptional.  
 135. See Hickman, supra note 3, at 769. 
 136. For an argument that preclusion-based compulsory joinder has the opposite of its intended 
effects, albeit when implemented in a more extreme form, see Erichson, supra note 95, at 769–74. 
 137. The Selchert court alluded to its concern for the lack of any concrete support for the 
purported benefits of a one-action rule in recognizing ―the real possibility that such methods of 
achieving judicial economy may carry evils worse than the problem to which they are addressed.‖ 
Selchert v. State, 420 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Iowa 1988). 
 138. See supra Part IV.  
 139. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 141. See text accompanying note 124; Freer, supra note 100, at 838–39. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1774 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1751 
 
 
 
 
respect to judicial efficiency without harmful collateral effects. The 
preclusive consequences of a failure to join parties in comparative 
negligence actions, however, could be potentially damaging in the absence 
of widespread notice that such a rule has been adopted and some amount 
of guidance regarding the outer boundaries of its applicability and 
operation.
142
 In order to avoid as many problematic circumstances as 
possible, I propose that a state adopting a preclusive system of enforcing 
mandatory joinder, such as the Kansas one-action rule, should expressly 
look to interpretations of the rule that have been developed over time in 
Kansas.
143
 Permitting litigants (and potential litigants) to look to the case 
law that has developed since the inception of the rule in Kansas would 
eliminate much of the guesswork that might otherwise accompany the 
adoption of such a significant change in doctrine. Such guesswork could 
result in unnecessary harm to unsuspecting plaintiffs. Furthermore, 
following Kansas case law in this regard would promote judicial 
efficiency by eliminating much of the ―experimental‖ litigation required to 
establish a set of guidelines for the enforcement of a significant new 
procedural doctrine.
144
 
Unlike the argument based on judicial economy, the argument in favor 
of a one-action rule (or an analogue thereto) based on consistency and the 
integrity of the judicial system needs no evidentiary support.
145
 The fact 
that there can be no more than 100 percent total fault for any given injury 
is necessarily true, and a judicial system should not be permitted to render 
judgment in violation of logical necessities. To the extent that fundamental 
fairness (as distinguished from the actual achievement of fair results for a 
particular set of parties) is a legitimate and desirable end of our judicial 
 
 
 142. The relative significance of the fundamental unfairness that can be said to result from the 
lack of notice of substantive or procedural legal doctrines should not be overstated. If notice of such 
limitations were a relevant consideration in determining the equity of such doctrines, widespread doubt 
as to the propriety of most procedural limitations would necessarily follow. For example, statutes of 
limitations, almost by necessity, operate without regard to an individual‘s knowledge of their existence 
or applicability. An alternative system would provide that one must consciously forfeit a claim by 
failing to exercise one‘s legal rights within a statutory period of which one had actual awareness. This 
would render statutes of limitations almost obsolete, save for circumstances in which a plaintiff has no 
intention of seeking relief in court (or probably by settlement, given that the prospect of allowing the 
defendant to avoid litigation is often a powerful bargaining tool). Thus, our legal system seems entirely 
comfortable bestowing upon lawyers the responsibility to learn, understand, and abide by such 
procedural limitations and allowing noncompliance to preclude the bringing of claims despite the 
practical effects (i.e., the absolute preclusion of a judicial remedy) on the plaintiffs themselves.  
 143. See supra Part II. 
 144. Cf. Erichson, supra note 95, at 772–73 (explaining that the New Jersey ―entire controversy 
doctrine‖ increased litigation, and thus decreased efficiency, in part by creating ―too much ancillary 
litigation‖ related to determining the doctrines applicability). 
 145. See supra Part IV. 
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system, a one-action rule would promote fundamental fairness by ensuring 
logical consistency.
146
 
The implementation of a one-action rule should not only rely on 
considerations of fairness in principle; it is also relevant that the doctrine 
actually achieve just results for the parties whose rights and liabilities it 
would directly affect.
147
 This means that any jurisdiction that adopts such a 
rule should pay close attention to the consequences of its enactment on 
litigants, rather than focusing complete attention on the achievement of 
judicial efficiency and fundamental fairness. Here, supplementing the one-
action rule with a broad, discretionary compulsory joinder rule proves 
significant.
148
 If parties and judges are not allowed to compel the inclusion 
of all negligent parties, judicially efficient and fundamentally fair results 
might often be achieved by sacrificing the injured party‘s opportunity to 
bring about a just resolution.
149
 If, for example, several responsible parties 
were allowed to escape liability through tactfully avoiding the first action 
brought by a plaintiff, the result would be the avoidance of repetitive 
litigation and the apportionment of fault totaling 100 percent. Thus, 
judicial economy and fundamental fairness would be promoted.
150
 But, for 
the plaintiff, there would have been a complete lack of justice. While it is 
possible that the plaintiff might still receive compensation totaling the 
amount of fault attributed to defendants in the action, and while such 
compensation might accurately reflect the total amount to which the 
plaintiff is entitled,
151
 the inability to hold particular negligent parties 
 
 
 146. See supra Part IV.B. The distinction between fundamental fairness and fair results for a 
particular set of individuals is not meant to suggest the judicial system should subordinate one 
principle to the other. Rather, it is intended to emphasize that the two are distinct objectives and that 
only the former is the subject of this particular sub-argument. Fundamental fairness, in this context, 
refers to the idea that the legal system seeks to achieve resolutions that are fair in the abstract. Hence, 
whether or not it would be fair to a particular plaintiff who has obtained a comparative negligence 
apportionment of 100 percent to then be allowed to pursue a negligent party that was absent from the 
first action is immaterial to the idea of fundamental fairness. In the abstract, it is illogical and 
impermissible to attribute anything over 100 percent total fault for a particular occurrence, so the 
subsequent suit should be barred by a consideration of fundamental fairness. This is not to say that 
other considerations are automatically ignored once fundamental fairness is considered. Indeed, the 
discussions of judicial economy and the practical effects of a one-action rule are included as a 
testament to the opposite: fundamental fairness is but one relevant consideration to be weighed in 
determining the propriety of widespread adoption of a preclusion-based mandatory joinder doctrine. 
 147. McCoid alluded to the possibility that such procedural rules, resting as they may be on sound 
principles, might carry practical dangers that justify their absence. McCoid, supra note 119, at 728. 
 148. See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra Part IV. 
 151. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. Theoretically, it makes sense to assume that the 
negligence of an absent potential defendant would be attributed to a present defendant rather than to 
the plaintiff, and that the failure of one defendant to compel the joinder of another would harm only 
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proportionately accountable is unfortunate. And the idea that total 
compensation would, in most cases, accurately reflect the fault of all 
parties other than the plaintiff is probably inaccurate.
152
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Kansas one-action rule provides a feasible model for preclusion-
based mandatory party joinder in comparative negligence actions, but it 
also has its shortcomings.
153
 If courts are determined to take seriously the 
oft-cited concern for judicial efficiency and the preservation of court 
resources,
154
 a system of ensuring the adjudication of all potential claims 
in one-action should not be confined solely to comparative negligence 
actions.
155
 Instead, courts should adopt compulsory joinder rules with 
broad judicial discretion for joining parties whose potential liability would 
prevent duplicative future litigation. Such rules should extend beyond 
comparative negligence actions to maximize their effects on judicial 
efficiency. Further, courts should be actively encouraged to utilize their 
discretion in this regard. This will help ensure both maximal operation of 
the rule and minimal preclusion of comparative negligence actions in 
which potential defendants were left out of prior fault attributions (the 
 
 
that defendant whose oversight (or strategic exclusion) resulted in the absence. This assumption rests 
on a particular set of circumstances that is not always present. It is plausible that there are cases in 
which the absent party‘s negligence is more apparently connected to the conduct of the plaintiff, yet a 
defendant in the action is better positioned than the plaintiff to know of the existence and potential 
responsibility of the absent party. Furthermore, it is probably a mistake to assume such rigid and 
mechanical operation of the factfinder in comparative negligence actions. Take, for example, another 
variation of the hypothetical situation in footnote 112 above. Alicia, after being injured while riding in 
a car during a wreck, sues Brian (the driver) and the car manufacturer for negligence. She secures a 
fault apportionment of 30 percent to the manufacturer, 50 percent to Brian, and 20 percent to herself. 
If, instead, Alicia had known of the potential responsibility of the municipality for the negligently 
designed and constructed intersection at which the wreck occurred and joined in the action the 
municipality and the engineering firm responsible for the intersection, can it be said with much 
confidence that the negligence attributed to these additional parties would not have resulted in a 
smaller percentage attributed to Alicia? Logically, it would seem that the dangerous intersection would 
reduce Brian‘s relative fault for the wreck, given that his driving is most apparently connected to the 
relative safety of the roadway. But, in practice, it is entirely reasonable to assume that the effect of 
including the municipality and the engineering firm in the fault attribution would have significantly 
less-predictable effects, and that a failure to join these parties in the action might substantially impair 
the equity of the final resolution.  
 152. Consider also the effect on particular defendants whose proportionate negligence might have 
been reduced by the inclusion of other responsible parties, but who may be in the best position (even 
relative to other defendants) to know of the existence or conduct of such absent parties. 
 153. See supra Parts IV–V. 
 154. See supra Part IV.A. 
 155. See supra Part V. 
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latter being critical to the practical fairness of such a preclusive 
doctrine).
156
 
The cautious implementation of discretionary compulsory joinder and 
systematic preclusion of repetitive litigation should not end the pursuit of 
the fairness, efficiency, and integrity of the judicial system through the 
final adjudication of groups of related claims. It is essential that 
jurisdictions remain open to modification and extension of such doctrines 
in order to ascertain which versions of various procedural policies are best 
able to achieve these objectives.
157
 But perhaps even more important than 
modification and extension is the need to examine such doctrines and their 
effects on both the systems in which they operate and the parties they 
directly affect.
158
 The lack of statistics regarding the effects of rules 
established to promote judicial efficiency stands in stark contrast to the 
abundance of complaints and cries for such rules.
159
 A significant element 
of my proposal thus suggests that proponents of adopting policies to 
achieve the objectives described herein take significant steps toward 
including actual benefits and observations of the consequences of these 
policies. Until such data is available, informed predictions based on more 
solid observations (rather than mere conjecture and principle) should 
suffice as adequate support for their adoption, especially absent evidence 
suggesting that the intended effects would not be realized or that adverse 
effects would result from their enactment. 
The Kansas one-action rule is a good example of the sort of bold 
experimentation necessary to actually address the numerous problems 
resulting from repetitive and inconsistent comparative fault 
determinations.
160
 It appears to operate equitably, especially given the 
widespread awareness of the rule in Kansas and the predictability provided 
by the abundance of case law interpreting and modifying the rule, as well 
as the legislature‘s express acceptance of the doctrine as enforced by the 
judiciary.
161
 It is highly unlikely that a plaintiff‘s attorney in that state will 
be blindsided by the rule, which forces attorneys to consider the best 
interests of the system along with those of a client at the outset of 
litigation and through the course of adjudication—the ideal situation being 
 
 
 156. See supra Part V. 
 157. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 137–40. 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 137–40. 
 160. See supra Part IV. 
 161. See supra Part II.B–C. 
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sought in much legal scholarship on the issue.
162
 Supplementing this rule 
with the revised compulsory joinder requirements and adopting both rules 
in other jurisdictions will likely increase judicial efficiency, and will 
increase fairness by avoiding inconsistencies and logical anomalies in the 
judicial system.
163
 In the meantime, interested scholars as well as 
legislatures should take up the task of determining whether efficiency is 
indeed increased through such policies. Any undesirable consequences on 
individual litigants should also be documented and scrutinized. While it is 
surely desirable to preserve and protect the integrity and resources of the 
system, the interests of individual litigants and ground-level fairness 
should not be completely subordinated to the broad-view systemic 
improvement. If positive results on both counts do not follow from the 
proposed changes, courts and legislatures should experiment with other 
options to ensure the retirement of the oft-lamented status quo.
164
 
Jaran Moten  
 
 
 162. See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 3, at 769 (―[T]he shift to comparative fault removed the 
incentives for defendants to join other potentially liable parties without placing comparable incentives 
on plaintiffs. . . . Plaintiffs have discovered this weakness and exploit it by using multiple actions to 
increase their recoveries. The results are both inefficient and unfair to defendants.‖). 
 163. See supra Part V. 
 164. An immediately apparent alternative might be to adopt the broadened version of compulsory 
party joinder, but without the preclusive effects of the one-action rule. This would not achieve judicial 
efficiency to the same degree as the enactment of the preclusive rule, but it could be formulated to 
allow independent judicial review of situations involving parties who were left out of previous 
litigation, but whose liabilities could have been determined therein to preserve judicial resources and 
ensure consistency. Supplemented by res judicata, such a doctrine would be a step in the right 
direction, but to a significantly lesser degree than one supplemented by a preclusive effect on future 
claims. 
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